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PREFATORY REMARK 
This is a slightly revised and extended version of a paper presented at the 
Second Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, 
held at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, 3-8 September 1990. The 
theme of the Conference was "European Nationalism: Toward 1992". 
The paper was given in a workshop entitled "The EC and Euro-Nationalism" , 
chaired by Professor Charlotte Ku, the American Society of International Law, 
Washington D.C., USA. It will be included in the select conference proceedings, 
to be published by Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1991. 
The paper breaks down into two main parts: Sections 1, 2 and 3 make up the 
originally distributed paper, while section 4 is an expanded form of the 
supplementary oral presentation given in the workshop. 
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1. OUTLINES OF THE DEBATE 
To embark on a discussion of the relationship between nationalism and! 
supranationalism within the European Communities (EC) is also to venture into 
the firing-line. It is a subject which, on the one hand, has been hotly disputedl 
ever since the commencement of the EC in the 1950's and which more or less 
exactly has followed the ups and downs of the political discussion, from ardent: 
federalism via intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism to our present-day 
debate concerning the Single Market and the Political Union; on the other hand .. 
not only has the subject been bedevilled by historical ghosts such as the less tharn 
reputable history of modern European nationalism, by the frequent reluctance DE 
politicians and other opinion leaders to address the question directly and frankly. 
and by the different emphases given to the matter by different member-states, 
but in addition debates often seem muddled and confused because of a certaill.. 
lack of focus: do we mean the same thing by, say, "European identity" or 
"political union", is the commitment to closer cooperation within the Ee actually-
a move towards the abolition of the nation-states, into a "post-nationalist" era, 
how much truck should one have with the supranational ideals and rhet oric 
coming out of the Commission, how do they relate to the interests and 
aspirations of politicians in the different member-states, and - not least - to the 
national sentiments of the various populations, etc. When the smoke lifts on 
these and similar questions, one sometimes realises that we might not have been 
talking about the same things, or widely different points of departure and sets 
of implicit assumption and value might have hindered any real clarification of' 
the important issues. Add to this that these issues comprise both political, 
economic, cultural and socio-psychological questions, and it should hopefully be 
clear that this area is at least a maze, if not a mess. "Euro-nationalism" 
(whatever that is) is hedged around with ifs and buts, qualifications and 
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provisions, doubts and fears, hopes and illusions. Are the supranational ideals 
anything over and above exactly that: ideals for the gratuitous consumption of 
whoever might be so inclined? Are they guidelines for action, or moral 
legitimacy? Is nationalism being eroded? And should it be? In other words, how 
does the EC affect the nation-state as a repository of identity? 
It would be well to remind oneself at this stage of some of the questions 
raised by Renan in his famous Sorbonne lecture, "What is a nation?" ("Qu'est: 
qu'une nation?", 1882), pertaining to what we are used to thinking of as the 
"classical" nation-state in Europe, but also questions with obvious implications 
for the subject under review here: 
"Do interests suffice to make a nation? I do not think so. Community 
of interest brings about trade agreements, but nationality has a 
sentimental side to it. ( ... ) A Zollverein is not a patrie. ( ... ) A nation 
is a soul, a spiritual principle. ( .. . ) a large-scale solidarity, constituted 
by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of 
those that one is prepared to make in the future. ( ... ) A nation's 
existence is ( ... ) a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is 
a perpetual affirmation of life . " 
This organic-existentialist explanation of the nation-state and its nationalism. 
effects a combination between "nature" and "popular will", but divorces these 
from "interest" (Zollverein etc.): "Nothing purely material suffices for it"! In a 
sense, national sentiment is seen as the opposite of self-interest, manifests itself 
best in "sacrifices". One is reminded of Tiinnies' distinction between "Gemein-
schaft" and "Gesellschaft", the former based on a "volonte generale" that 
transcends materialism; or of Benedict Anderson's "imagined communities "; or 
of the German expression "Schicksalsgemeinschaft". How does modern El1rope 
relate to such categories? Is the EC merely a "customs union", and if so from. 
where derive all the supranational ideals? Why is it that this "union" constantly 
conjures up notions, positively or negatively conceived, of a common European 
identity etc, which e.g . EFT A has never done, nor NATO on another supra-
national scale? Have we come to the point in history envisaged by Renan in the 
same lecture: "The nations are not something eternal. They had their beginnings 
and they will end. A European confederation will very probably replace them. 
But such is not the law of the century in which we are living". Are we abc>u( to 
achieve this European confederation? Do politicians want it that way, do 
economic developments make it inevitable, do people generally back it up? Is 
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this the law of the century in which we are living? Or are we in need of 
completely new analytic tools, theoretical parameters? 
2. THE NATIONAL CORE OF EC SUPRANATIONALISM 
It is obvious that the outlines of the debate I have tried to sketch might take on 
the nebulous and blurred quality indicated for an additional reason to the ones 
I have enumerated: It might conceivably be due to the contradictory, paradoxical 
and unique character of the subject in hand. The question of" national identity" 
v. "supranationalism" could in the EC-context prove to be unprecedented, its 
political and cultural effects novel and sui generis - as so much else springing 
from this forum of European collaboration. This uniqueness is sometimes, for 
want of more precise terminology, addressed by means of negations: "Less than 
a federation, more than a regime", as William Wallace chooses to call the Ee 
as a political system (Wallace, Wallace & Webb 1983,403 ff.). "It lacks full 
legitimacy", is "not yet a fully developed political system" , as the same author 
states further on, whilst taking note of the fact that there is not (yet) a "sense of 
common loyalty, of a shared we-feeling sufficient to persuade groups and 
citizens to accept recurrent and structural sacrifices of their interests in the 
furtherance of the interests of others or of the system as a whole" (420). Paul 
Taylor (1983) finds that there are "limits to integration" , debating whether Karl 
Deutsch's concept of a "security community" would be applicable or whether 
the limits set derive more from "utilitarian calculations", noting that "the 
European peoples (are) still very much intact" (56). Former advisor to the 
Danish Prime Minister, Erik Holm, in an article published by the daily 
"Politiken" (7 June 1990), attempts to embrace both sides of the paradox: "The 
European Community has been an ambiguous creation from the very start. On 
the one hand it is seen as a challenge to the nation-state, on the other it contains 
opportunities for the continued existence of the nation." Erik Holm then goes on 
to describe the various reasons for the member-states regarding the EC as either 
an opportunity or a threat, particularly as regards the dividing-line between the 
original "Six" (for whom the EC was a question of ensuring the survival of the 
nation), and the latecomers (who for different reasons saw themselves as being 
compelled to enter, and who therefore are still regarded as "minimalists "). And 
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the former British EC Commissioner, Christopher Tugendhat, in his bOc> k 
Making Sense of Europe (1986), sees one of the misfortunes of the ComlUunity 
in the overdone supranationalism of the federalists which is out of step with 
"reality" and needs a thorough overhaul. Not in order to be done away with 
entirely, but to emphasise that the EC cannot and should not supplant the nation-
states, but is their complement. We should recognise that tension and conflict s 
are part and parcel of the Community's rationale, and that unity and rivalry are 
constant companions. Tugendhat calls it "creative tension" . On the level Df 
politics, things look and sound much the same. In the autumn of 1988, t!he 
Danish Prime Minister, Poul Schluter, created an uproar in his own country 
when, in a speech in London, he predicted the demise of the nation-state in 
Europe, though his policies before as well as after that speech hardly convinc:e 
one that he is an ardent enthusiast of a federal European Union. Simultaneously, 
almost, Margaret Thatcher was making her by now famous speech to tlue 
College d 'Europe in Bruges where she did pay lip-service to the European idea 
but in all but form championed the continued existence of the nations and Df 
national identity (but see also section 4 for a more detailed evaluation of tJ.e 
background for the speech). And even in the most "European" of member-states , 
the FRG, the question that seems to occupy the minds and not least the heart s 
of politicians as well as the Yolk is the nationalist rather than the supranationalist 
one; the pace with which it is apparently possible to "reunite" two states with 
different political systems into a new and enlarged nation-state contrasts rather 
glaringly with the twists and turns, the ifs and the buts, the entire caveat that 
surround the "political union n within the EC as a whole, the long-drawn-out 
process of negotiation, hustling, hassling and bickering, approving deals aILd 
laws on day I and breaking or bending them on day 2. All very confusing. 
Tugendhat's creative tension might have something for it. 
At least this will provide a point of departure for a few theses, in an attempt 
to come to grips with some of the confusion. The first thesis, which is also tlJ.e 
most important, is the following: 
1. The EC is the institutional point of convergence of national, no t 
supranational interests and aspirations, in unique historical circ:umstances. 
The seemingly contradictory positions outlined above are best resolved, I 
contend, if the EC is regarded from the point of view of national(ist) interest s 
in a particular kind of international environment. This will also help to explain 
the rationale of supranationalism in the EC form as well as the moderate , non-
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exclusive patriotism that seems to be the word of the day, filling in as the 
mediator between "classical" nationalism and the abolition of the nation-state as 
a paradigm of identity altogether. 
I argue that this "patriotic" - as normally opposed to "nationalistic" - tendency 
in modern Europe is not the result of a greater willingness to forego national 
interests or a more basically friendly attitude towards "the others" - let alone!ll. 
supranational angle unrelated to national interests -, but the national response t()) 
the post-WW II situation in Europe, where the nation-states, whether theY'" 
formally belonged to the winning or the losing side, had to realise that the onlY'" 
way to be reinstated to some national sovereignty, economically and politically .. 
was - paradoxically - to enter into a relationship of dependence vis-a -vis the:o 
USA and, as a corollary, to take leave of one of the traditional means of 
nationally asserting oneself in the European context, i. e. the military, and instead.. 
look for "exterritorial" power and influence in other and more peaceable ways. 
This resulted in an unusual form of political cooperation: The EuropeaIl. 
Communities, based not only on the fact that it was no longer the EuropeaIl. 
powers that were "pulling the strings" in world affairs, but also on a "pooling" 
of political sovereignty. This is thus a distorted reflection of the unprecedented 
global politico-military environment of the immediate post-war world, where tbe 
national freedom of the European powers (especially Germany, of course) was 
granted on certain terms and was in this sense limited. This has restricted not, 
it seems to me, the national basis and aspirations of these European nation-states 
(the less so the more successful their newfound way towards national strength 
proved to be), but the conditions of their mutual competition. The EC offers a 
way of enlarging the national scope for politics, diplomacy, economics, of 
gaining influence and markets beyond one's own territory, for all the mernber-
states involved. Regarded thus, the EC is no more, no less than the instTUment 
of the member-states for the furtherance of their interests - whilst in the process 
proving to have the additional moral advantage of being linked with a supra-
national idealism. 
However, there's a lot more to it than that, for in spite of the basic nationalist 
objectives, the very form of EC cooperation/competition necessarily takes an 
institutional, "supranational" direction, or in other words, 
2. The EC entails a partial surrender of sovereignty. And though the end 
might justify the means , this particular means lands every member-state in a 
permanent conflict between the "natural" desire of sovereign states for the rnost 
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all-encompassing power execution possible within secure borders, and their 
equally strong wish to make an imprint on the world (this is partly a conflict 
between politics and economics). So in order to take advantage of the Be as a 
means for the strengthening of the nation-state, one has at the same time to 
accept a certain weakening of the same nation-state, at least in formal term.s. 
There's the rub and the paradox. In a way, the "means" assumes its own 
institutional forms, makes itself partly independent of that which it is meant to 
serve, constructs its own autonomous aims and ideals and thus endangers, or 
seems to endanger, the very core of the nation-states: their national sovereignty -
and hence possibly their various nationalisms? 
This situation might, of course, be interpreted as Joseph Rovan has done 
("Nation und Europa", 1985): the nation-state lives on but in a qualitatively 
different form or even only as an empty shell ("dem Anschein nach"). I would 
be more cautious here: It is true that the EC nations have had to yield a little bit 
of their political self-determination in order to achieve a strengthening of their 
economies etc. This is a paradox, or as Rovan calls it, a "Zwickmiihle", but still 
a far cry from the death of the nation-states, let alone their national identities. 
What we are seeing is not the passing away of the national framework nor of 
nationalistic emotions and allegiance, I contend. This is not the postnational 
narrative, but in an important sense the heyday of nationalism (cf. also 
developments in Eastern Europe, in the Third World, in Central America, in 
Germany etc). There is no good reason to associate nation and nationalism 
"naturally" with the state of affairs round the turn of this century, as we usually 
do - neither in political nor in cultural terms. In fact, for most European nations 
it marked the beginning rather than the end. Most European nation-states have 
used the larger part of this century to "nationalise" the popular masses, instill 
in them a national pride and identity, teach them about the natural correlation 
between state and people, construct national fictions and moral evaluations of the 
world along national lines . It may be that the nation-state has played out its 
historically progressive role at precisely the point in time when "West" 
European states have secured the loyal support of their citizens. But that is 
another matter. Why should the destiny of nations and their modernised 
fundamentalism (national identity) be decided according to whether they are 
progressive, rational or whatnot? If nations are far from defunct, such 
determinism at least ought to be. What am I driving at? Does the EC mean 
nothing for national identity, supranationalism etc? But certainly it does. 
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3. Creative tension of identity? In a political milieu characterised partly by tine 
ditching of a number of radical means formerly employed as the national optio- n 
for open confrontation, partly by the willing commitment of the member-states 
to an institutional form of permanent political cooperation over and above tILe 
modulations usually obtaining between nations, it is inevitable that (the discours..e 
of) national identity and national allegiance must be affected too . Within the Ee, 
we have seen a modification, a glorification and an internationalisation Cl f 
nationalism. 
It is modified in the sense that perceptions and images of "the Other" i:n 
Europe can no longer have the form of exclusiveness. Hostile imagery, ope:n 
contempt and suspicion can no longer be vented openly, antagonism i s banne.d 
on the official level , and the hostilities that nevertheless keep cropp ing up - oftem 
within the gratuitous framework of old enemy images that die very hard indeed -
are softened, explained or laughed away, diverted into "harmless" areas sucIh 
as sports, economic wrangling, witticisms, or played down as friends t alking ad 
cross-purposes. Thus "official" pride in one's country is hemmed in (more 0 r 
less so, of course, depending on the 
country's modern history), because one of the parameters of nationalism -thee 
international comparison - is weakened. 
But this simultaneously entails the aspect of glorification: suddenly the u topia 
of nationalism, the moderate dream of intellectuals , the postulate of cos -
mopolitanism have come true. Peace reigns between the EC nations, the 
countries and their peoples respect each other, recognition has replaced 
contempt, patriotism walks hand in hand with intercultural understanding _ 
Nationalism in its negative form seems to have disappeared, only the "welto-
ffener" patriotism remains: "Weltoffenheit und Patriotismus sind Jceine 
Gegensatze. Wer im eigenen Land beheimatet und verwurzelt ist, der wird den 
Patriotismus seines Nachbarn verstehen und achten . Europa entwi ckeIt si ch in 
diese Richtung" (Weizsacker 1987). 
The glorification of nationalism involves the intemationalisat ion of it , not juS1t 
in the sense that other national identities are respected and recognised or thatt 
"European identity" is introduced as a new ideal, but also - and more impor-
tantly - that a dual national/European identity is coming to the fo re (e.g. b eing 
German and European at the same time) . This does manifestly not mean", 
however, that the two sides of the dualism are given the same significance oc 
belong on the same "ontological" level or can be evaluated according to the 
same criteria. We are somehow back to Renan: all indications (e .g. frorm 
I); 
EUROBAROMETER) show that on the one hand most EC-populations g-ive 
added emphasis to EC membership, even think it is a good and beneficial tUng 
(at least for "their country"), but rarely think of and definitely do not jee-l a 
European identity/allegiance. "Interest" and "emotion" in the pan-European 
context are falling apart (in the "classical" nation-state they are one and the sa me 
and derive from "nature"), a dichotomy of loyalties is being created (a CDst-
benefit loyalty towards the EC, an emotional/cultural towards the nation) wh:ich 
is not akin to either that between a country and a "Zollverein" pure and simp:>le, 
or to that of federal or multinational nation-states (UK, Switzerland, USA etc .). 
This points towards the creation of unique blends of "national" and "integ ra· 
tionist" forms of mentality and discourse within the EC. 
However, whatever the precise form, the national basis of European 
supranationalism shines clearly through. It is not to be understood as he 
elimination of nation-states, let alone national identities, in favour of sorrne 
European super state, but as a particular official brand of nationalisrn. In fiLct, 
the national basis for all EC supranationalism is fairly conspicuous once rou 
start looking for it: For instance, in the composition of the Commission, where 
national representation is meticulously safeguarded; in the rationale of the heavy· 
handed agricultural policies that only make sense if they are seen in the light of 
the interest of each member-state in maintaining an independent provision of 
basic necessities; in the nebulous "principle of subsidiarity" (one of J. Delors's 
terminological inventions), which in fact turns the relationship between higber 
and lower decision-making levels upside down as compared with the w-ay 
national sovereigns act within their own territory; in the supranational symbolism 
created by the formal existence of the EC as an independent structure above a=nd 
beyond the member-states: flag, hymn, passport etc, which partly strike you as 
quite artificial constructs and partly because they are evidently moulded a=nd 
modelled on the symbolic imagery of the nation-states and serve Dnly as 
appendices to the national markers (for example, the EC flag is hardly ever us-ed 
alone, but appears as no. 13). It could in fact be argued that "European identity" 
is no more and no less than such official rhetorical and symbolistic "discourse::", 
the ideal point of convergence of different national intentions taking advanta~e 
of each other within a seemingly permanent political structure. Fr()m tbis 
perspective, the EC and its institutions both reflect and enact tl1e natio nal(ist) 
teleology in modern Europe. The implication , amongst other things, is tmat 
within this teleology, "European identity" as a mental and emotional structll re 
must be funnelled through the national identities and cannot be "allowed' to talke 
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too firm roots. Hence the rhetorical acts of tight-rope walking performed by 
European politicians; when addressing their peoples, they must steer hazardous 
courses between Scylla and Charybdis, between nationalism and supra-
nationalism. Thatcher: "I do believe that for nations of the European Community 
freely to work together and to strengthen their cooperation is just as worthy a 
purpose (as building the US, DH). But to submerge their identity and variety 
would be contrary to the instincts of our peoples and therefore could not bear 
fruit". Mitterrand: "Europe in the abstract, a geometric shape - is a caricature. 
The true Europe needs nations just as a living body needs flesh and blood" . 
Natural metaphors abound, we note, when statesmen talk about their nations. 
Still, they set a lot of store by their European cooperation and want their people 
to be committed, too (cf. e.g. elections to the European Parliament). Erik Holm, 
who I quoted earlier, is right: The EC both presents an opportunity and a threat 
to the nation-states involved. Or differently phrased: It is an instrument for the 
nation-states without being an instrument for their national identities - except 
perhaps in an odd and backwards way (cf. Danes who feel more Danish because 
of the "menace" represented by the EC). This is seen more clearly if we turn 
the mirror. 
3. THE SUPRANATIONAL RATIONALE: TOWARDS A FEDERAL 
EUROPE? 
What I mean is this: It is not only necessary to explain the national core-content 
of the EC and its supranational idealism, but the supranationalism must itself be 
explained. Whence does it spring, is it necessary and, if so, how and why? And 
as I said at an earlier stage why is there no real supranationalist question 
connected with, say, NATO, EFTA, or even the UN? In such cases it seems 
fairly obvious to all and sundry that they are international organisations 
consisting of a variety of sovereign states which all take part out of (some kind 
of) self-interest. Not so with the EC - why? 
What I am implying is that an answer cannot simply refer to the fact that the 
EC is an independent structure in its own right (though it is a necessary 
prerequisite). Nor is it enough to argue (as e.g. C. Tugendhat does in the ~ork 
cited above) that the EC needed its supranational ideals as "moral authority" in 
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a post-war world where European nationalism had been discr edi ted (though this 
is undoubtedly an important fac tor , especially as regards W. Germany). Rath er, 
the root cause would seem to be the enforced limitations on European 
nations/nationalism springing from the geo-politicai results of WW II, i.e. a 
unique kind of dependence on the US and a functional role in the East·W est 
confrontation, both of which excluded the West European nations - some of 
which had rather more "glorious" histories - from fully asserting themselves as 
independent, sovereign nation-states, compelled them to work together in a form 
entailing a partial "pooling" of sovereignty, explicitly debarred from independent 
military politics, and on a permanent institutionalised basis. It is this unique 
combination of a) political (rather than purely economic) cooperat ion, b) 
abandonment of sovereignty (on a voluntary basis), c) no military aspect (rat her 
the EC is a compensation for the exclusion from military methods: .. the 
continuation of violent confrontation using other means?" , turning the tables on 
Clausewitz's famous dictum) , which not only makes EC supranational ism 
possible, but necessary as well. And once it has been rendered necessary, it 
must be turned to advantage, be cultivated, developed and cherished, as "moral 
authority" , the "European peace movement", ultimate proof that Europeans have 
learnt from history and done away with nationalist animosity. Whilst deriving 
from objective conditions beyond the control of the EC nations, their supra· 
nationalism presents itself as a common decision freely arrived at, a new kind 
of European "volonte generale" - not surprisingly most strongly advocated in 
the six founding nations which had been most seriously debilitated by t he war 
and were hence in dire need of the moral superstructure that the Ee cooperat ive 
ideal represented. 
The "latecomers" have proved to be more pragmatic in their dealings "",ith the 
supranational ideals and rhetoric, having less of a need for it and often. indeed 
having to defend their "minimalist", self-centred stances against the mo ralising 
rhetoric of those who are truly "communautaires" (this should be divorced from 
the question of who acts how in what circumstances: the most European- minded 
member-states do not always fulfill their moral imperative). When it comes to 
rhetoric, supranationalism is often presented in the guise of an end in itself. 
When it comes to practical politics , this moral stand can sometimes be useful 
too: as a means of making minimalists look overly egoistic and thus of squeezing 
them into a corner. In other words, supranationalism - the idea 0 f "Europe" 
acting in concert - can be utilised by each of the nations as a mean s to further 
a particular national cause . In the EC, "Europe" has become a novel receptacle 
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for negative images of "the other", positive images of national selfhood: in the 
original "six", mainly by condemning the newcomers as self-seeking oppor-
tunists; among the latecomers (particularly Denmark and Great Britain), by 
conjuring up images of the EC as a threat to legitimate nationalism and giving 
proof of the hypocritical attitudes of the genuine Europeanists. Where "political 
union" is a plus-word among the founding nations, it is negatively or indif-
ferently received among the rest, who are accused of going too slowly ahead and 
wanting only "negative integration". On the level of the single member-state, 
the form and content of the supranational question stand in a direct relation to 
its need for it, its advantage from it (moral, political, economic)(cf. section 4) . 
Without itself in any serious sense being a repository of identity, the 
supranationalism of the EC then seriously affects the identity question vis-a-vis 
the individual nation-state. On the one hand, it makes national identity, in its 
open-minded mode, attractive and legitimate; on the other, it makes it more 
difficult to champion national affiliation within exclusive, contrastive parameters 
- at least in the European context. This is a containment of nationalism 
corresponding to the limitations on the nations' sovereignty which EC 
supranationalism obliquely reflects. All the nations have entered into commit-
ments that influence the orthodox identity structure of national identity, by 
inviting their citizens to invest their calculations for the future not only in 
relation to their own political sovereign, but also to institutions formally superior 
to it. Thus, if nothing else, the existential naturalism of national identity (cf. 
Renan) is questioned simply by having to be constantly debated and - where 
possible - reasserted. This is an anomalous situation. The partial surrender of 
sovereignty which the EC entails (but which no statesmen favour as such) makes 
the call for the emotional support of citizens all the more urgent. At the same 
time it cannot just be taken for granted . If national identity is a discourse which 
politicians willingly embrace and quite honestly support, European identity is a 
double-edged sword to which they have to pay lip-service, but must simul-
taneously reject as a form of rival emotionalism. Its superficiality must be made 
clear, but cannot be openly stated. It is national pragmatism couched in the 
rhetoric of supra nationalism. But hence also the "danger": Will the means in fact 
outsmart the end? Is it possible that although the EC is not a step towards the 
superstate, a Federal Europe, the conditions for the survival of the nation-state 
are so unpropitious that we are sliding towards Renan's "European con-
federation "? Will EC supranationalism take the place of national identities 
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instead of just complementing them? Have the EC countries set in motion a 
string of developments that they cannot control? 
Well, as I have indicated, I think not. Rather, it is important to realise tine 
historical uniqueness of the European dialectic between nationalism aa.d 
supranational commitments which may modify the conditions of the nation-
states, render identity structures more muddled, but at the same time provides 
the milieu for the wheelings and dealings of nations. And as current develop-
ments in Europe seem to confirm, nationalism is far from extinct. For the EC, 
the disappearance of the East-West confrontation will tend towards a liberatio-n 
of national identity (something which is confirmed by developments in Germany) 
rather than a reinforcement of supranational ism. The stress in the future might 
well be shifted towards the plural form of the European Communities, and thlB.S 
towards the instrumental aspect. To all intents and purposes, the century in 
which we are living is still a very national one. 
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4. NATIONALISM AND SUPRANATIONALISM IN THREE 
MEMBER-STATES: (West) Germany, Denmark, Great lJritain 
(supplementary oral presentation) 
All nation-states, all national mentalities entail an international dimension, since 
nation-states are not only "sovereign", but also "Iimited" (Anderson 1983). Tine 
particular form of the nationalism/internationalism interaction in a given natio:on 
is the result of complex interactions between the history, interests, political 
status, culture, and ambitions of the country, and can, of course, be dealt with 
from a variety of angles. (Cf. e.g. Hoffmann 1968) 
I am not going to pursue these very general questions further now. 
My concern is - on the background of sections 1, 2 and 3 - to enquire into thle 
relevant modulations and configurations in respect of the EC in three of iets 
member-states . Time of course only allows for a very brief outline. 
You might have noticed that I have so far been using the term "supranational" 
rather than "international". The former seems more appropriate in the EC 
context, since the ordinary forms of national external orientation, foreign polic y 
and modes of perception and representation of "the Other" that we usually ref~I 
to as "international", have in the EC framework taken on a more permanena , 
committing and politically interlocking dimension. In fact, it is probably becaur;.e 
of this permanent and institutionalised political recognition - an important 
concept - that cultural questions and questions of identity ("European identity " 
for instance) keep imposing themselves on the debate. And this is of course als«) 
the reason why images of aliens in what I have elsewhere termed the "hostiL e 
mode" (Hedetoft 1990', Hedetoft 199()l) are more or less outlawed from 
consensual rhetoric these days. Images of the Other in modern Europe ar e 
"friendly" or "exotic", tending sometimes towards a discourse that symbolically 
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removes the barrier between "us" and "them" (this is still official discourse m() re 
than popular reality, as almost all empirical enquiries confirm). 
Let me also say before I address the question on a more concrete level thtat 
my methodical parameters - which will not by any means be applied s,!,s-
tematicaIly, but still constitute the methodical underpinning of the discussiom. 
are the following: 
* the discourse of nationalism/supranational ism (including hegemonic signs and 
images) 
* political culture and its relation to BC supranationalism and "dual identities" 
(includes images of aliens inherent in popular mythology) 
* the question of pragmatism as the prime mover of BC integration v. the moral 
emotionalism linked to the nation-state 
* and the historical dimension in its comparative European context, particularLy 
with respect to developments since WW II. It should be added that history can 
be regarded from three different, but mutually supportive aspects: as "reality" 
(= what actually happened); as the "fountain of myths and images" in tlte 
political culture; and as the "conditioner" of official rhetoric towards a 
particular balance between nationalism and supranationalism. 
Thus, my approach is a blend of cultural analysis and "l'histoire des mentalites" , 
an approach which I prefer to call the analysis of mentality. 
For the sake of brevity, and since in a presentation of this nature one has to 
faIl back on rather more rough-and-ready distinctions than may be advisable in 
a more nuanced discussion, I venture the hypothesis that the three member-states 
- Germany, Denmark and Great Britain - have each their own particular dialectic 
between "nationalism" and "supranationalism" within the modern European 
framework. Germany's could be called "nationalism-as-supranationalisrn"" 
Denmark's "nationalism-as-nationalism" and Great Britain's "supranationalism-
as-nationalism". Let me try to clarify what these catchwordy expressions entail-
and to add a few modifications. 
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I. West Germany: Nationalism-as-supranationalism 
West Germany is in an important sense the European country par excellence. Its 
Europeanism is embedded in the Constitution (1949), and the vacuum of German 
identity, of legitimate pride in the nation and of a sense of historical continuity 
which was the mental consequence of both the Nazi defeat and the division o-{ 
Germany was compensated for by a fervent European and international rheroric , 
and morality as well, and by attempts to construct a new German identity round 
a European political and economic commitment. A German political scientis t 
once aptly described West Germany as not a nation in search of a foreign policy" 
but a foreign policy in search of a nation. Nationalism is only acceptable in its 
patriotic mode, as "weltoffener Patriotismus". In March this year (1990), in the 
midst of the heated debate surrounding a united Germany, the West German 
foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher insisted that unification would noli: 
lessen Germany's European commitment, and advocated that we should think not: 
of a German Europe but a European Germany. The President of West GerIIlany,. 
Richard v. Weizsiicker, one of the principal figures behind this Europeanism. 
repeatedly states that "deutsche Kultur geh6rt zur europaischen Kultur" 
(Weizsiicker 1988, 25), and that "today we are no longer looking for our identity-
in a national inclusiveness and in the exclusion of others, but in the awarenes~ 
that the national cultures, which have been formed over the centuries, are relate<i 
to each other as fraternal members of an overarching all-European culture" 
(ibid., 16; my translation). 
Thus, this German discourse - which has also constructed the term "Verfa-
ssungspatriotismus" , "constitutional patriotism" - indicating that it rests on a 
less-than-stable political culture - tends to repress both the national and the 
pragmatic elements of German European cooperation. The Ee as "means" and 
as "end" fuse into one, which leads, also, to a particular use of "Europe' as a 
vehicle of rhetorical attacks against, and criticism of nations less open-minded, 
more "minimalist" and pragmatic (cf. Hedetoft 199(}l). 
European identity has thus acted vicariously as a national-identity stand-in and 
has been able to because of the success which "Europe" has implied for West 
Germany. This comes to the fore in two other, though subordinate discourses, 
that of the "Wirtschaftswunder" and that of "Wir sind wieder wer". The latter 
in turn links up with the "reunification "-motif, which has been consistently on 
the national agenda ever since the late forties, when reunification was proY ided 
for in another clause of the Constitution. 
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What's happening now is the end of that motif and the beginning of anothe:r. 
In this context, German "reunification" manifestly underpins my argument thoat 
it is national aspirations that permanently form the backbone of the Ee. In point 
of fact, the Be has, more than anything else, provided West Germany with the 
means to achieve its present-day economic and political strength. What it seems 
to be looking for now is not only a further strengthening of its economy and its 
political clout, but also, it seems, ajreeing of its national identity as somethim.g 
distinct from and the foundation of its European dimension. West Germany is 
the war loser that has turned into a manifest peacetime victor. It has capitalised 
on its international moralism, has been immensely strengthened as a nation -sta1l:e 
by insisting that it never had national, let alone nationalist aspirations. At this 
juncture, however, we are watching a nation emerging from the shadows of war, 
about to rewrite/retell its history, its myths and its identity. 
II. Denmark: Nationalism-as-nationalism 
Strangely enough, all German attempts to reforge/modernise the country's 
international image have cut hardly any ice with the Danes. The image of tne 
"ugly", militaristic and domination-seeking nation south of the border still haunts 
the Danish imagination, to the extent where - consciously or not - resistance to 
or scepticism about the Ee no doubt rests on a sign of equation between "EC" 
and "German interest-sphere". 
This indicates that, for Denmark, EC-cooperation is a "mariage de con-
venance". Most Danes still draw lines of separation between the possible - but 
disputed - economic/political benefits to be had from membership, and questions 
of identity, culture and supranationalism. Danish history, prejudices, political 
culture and small-nation interests converge in a discourse averse to anything but 
the most necessary forms of cooperation, conjuring up fears of an EC-
bureaucratic monstrosity out to submerge "Danishness", representing German 
intentions as insidious and rejecting also the possibility of "dual identities". 
Danishness is a mythology of antidiIvvian smallness and fairy-tale harmlessness, 
of having survived history fairly unscathed by keeping out of harm's way and 
too much international involvement. Hence, Danishness represents a cultural 
narrow-mindedness which has no consistent international dimension - other than 
possibly the non-committal symbolism of a Nordic brotherhood of nations and, 
earlier in the century, a distinct veneration for all things Anglo-British (some 
Danish historians argue that to all intents and purposes, Denmark was - until 
1930 or so - part of the British colonial empire, a British colony; at least it must 
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be conceded that it was part of the British sphere of influence, both economically 
and culturally). Also, it was no coincidence that Denmark's entry into the EC 
was actually forced upon it by Great Britain opting to become a member. 
Thus, Danes on average are proud patriots (though they often blush to admit 
it: they would rather live out their national identity than have it discussed/-
analysed) and see "nationalism" and "supranationalism" . at least in the EC 
context - as worlds apart rather than as complementary forms of consciousness. 
Even the most ardent political supporters of the EC have to vie for backing for 
the EC project on strict grounds of national interest and utility, because 
Denmark's influence in the world will be increased, because membership is 
simply inevitable, etc. The supranational dimension is regarded as negative, 
pooling of sovereignty in the EC-institutions is construed as a stepping-stone to 
a quick national demise (politically and culturally). And although the debates that 
the EC has triggered off concerning national identity and values have no doubt 
strengthened rather than weakened Danes' appreciation of their national 
affiliation; despite the deeply rooted "homogeneity of people and state"; and 
despite a political culture which is in large measure built on turning international 
defeats into a strengthening of national, cultural identity (unlike Germany)(cf. 
Hedetoft 19902, section V), the fiction of the imminent death of Danishness or 
its relegation to the status of mere regionalism is still very much alive and 
kicking· as are the concomitant hostile images of the Other (not just Germans , 
but refugees as well). Denmark has been nationalised in the course of this 
century, but at the expense of an international dimension, which did exist prior 
to the 1850's. In the particular Danish version of equality - "Janteloven", the 
'modernised' Ten Commandments of social morality - Danes are admonished to 
think nothing of themselves, not to set themselves above others, always to keep 
a low and humble profile . Today, they apply this yardstick rigorously to the EC. 
Conversely, the only true internationalism of Danishness resides in its obsessive 
concern with mirroring itself in the positive opinions of Denmark that can be 
ferreted out - or constructed . in the international community . 
III. Great Britain: Supranationalism-as-nationalism 
On the face of it, the British configuration might seem very similar to that of 
Denmark. Britain, too, is a latecomer to the EC, joining less out of enthusiasm 
than out of necessity and overt calculation. Also, in Britain - not least since the 
advent of Thatcher - the discourse and official imaginings about the EC have 
rested firmly on "minimalism", "national interest" and "getting as much out of 
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Europe as possible" . Further, it is evident that for a very long time the majorL t y 
of the British have shown no inclination towards European supranationalisr:n: 
"We're English . We're not European", as a Manchester cabdriver is said t o 
have stated with great force (Newsweek, 3 July 1989). 
Still, I would contend, this nationalist discourse rests on preconditioms 
radically different from those of Denmark, both in terms of history, politic:al 
culture and political ambitions. "Little Englandism" is counterpoised by the faa.et 
that this is a former colonial power, an island nation with strong internatiollLal 
and hegemonic aspirations, whose internationalism, historically, has been 
directed elsewhere than towards Europe (colonies , Commonwealth, tile 
American alliance) and which tends to regard "Europe" (Eq as a hamstringil!1g 
of its international freedom of movement (cf. also George 1989). And yet, 
"Europe" is now a necessary alliance, needed to halt the proverbial decline, Cll r e 
the British disease, and set the UK on the path towards renewed internatiolD.al 
clout; but in itself a hard one to swallow since Great Britain is not at t!he 
controlling centre of things in the EC, but rather an appendix on the GermilD-
French axis. 
Clearly, the political rhetoric in an internationally "demoted" power, vis-a-vis 
the EC, has to be stridently unaccommodating, has to pound on the utilitarian 
aspect of EC-membership, has to oppose "centralised control from Brussels" ecc. 
Not because it is satisfied with its insular nationalism, but because it wants rna Fe 
than the internationalism that EC can give it - true to its former status, its sti l l-
existing international ties/interests elsewhere, and its feelings of moral aDd 
political-cultural superiority (being the cradle of parliamentary dernocrac y, 
having civilised large parts of the world, being more cornmon-sensical than 
others, etc); and true, also, to the post-war humiliation of imperial decliIlle, 
economic deroute, and rejection, twice, at the hands of France, the age-odd 
enemy. The stance of Great Britain is nationalist all right, but it is a C(»S-
mopolitan sort of nationalism which refuses to be tied down by a "regionalist" 
Euro-nationalism. British politicians see themselves as the true internationalislts, 
which is why Thatcher in the same interview can talk of her "European 
nightmare" whilst insisting that she is the "best European of all" (Daily Ma.ii, 
18 May 1989). This was also the tenor of her (in)famous Bruges speech (Sept. 
1988). Where Danes see the EC as a danger because of the internatiomal 
enlargement that it contains, a new layer of commitment and orientation alien to 
the Danish mentality of small-nation self-sufficiency, the danger manifest in t!he 
British nationalist rhetoric rests on the perceived containment and restrictions of 
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British interests in a global context. This is not to say that the nationalism-cum-
racism of many ordinary "Brits" is not of a very narrow-minded and inward-
looking nature, but often that, too, is a sort of disillusioned reaction to Britain 
and British identity being no longer passports to (real or illusory) hegemony, 
Add to this that in a comparison with West Germany, Great Britain's national 
pride was not shattered but strengthened by WW II, and that for some time after 
the war both the economy, the American connection and the fiction of a role as 
an international moral "third force" in world politics were (respectively seemed 
to be) rather strong, and we can discern a picture of a nationalism with a heavy 
international, but not European bent, and further a nationalism rooted in a strong 
liberalistlIaissez-faire "pragmatic" tradition. It is these components rather than 
supranationalism as such that are at odds with Britain's membership of the Ee. 
IV. 4 brief 'extractions' 
On the basis of these considerations, a few conclusions and pointers can be 
extracted: 
1) Supranational discourse and idealism is most pronounced in the country 
(Germany) that has benefited most, as a nation-state, from the EC; and vice 
versa. What this shows is that supranationalism and national inter-
est/nationalism are linked to each other not as antithetical but as COIn-
plementary , that supranationalism is in a sense part and parcel of a 
national, though not nationalist, discourse. Or differently, a given national 
interest can be strengthened by avoiding rather than pursuing a nationalist 
rhetoric. 
2) The corollary of (1): The usefulness/advantage of the Ee for the three 
nations stands in an inverse relation to the legitimacy of a discourse of 
utility. In other words, for the two nations who stand to gain the least (or 
seem to) in the EC, the pervasive argument for membership has been har d-
core national interest, but of course in a negative framework: "we see it as 
a regrettable necessity", is the codeword. These nations bargain froIn a 
position of economic weakness but national-cultural and national-political 
strength. It is obvious that - discursively at least - .. integration" here cannot 
even seem to imply abandonment of sovereignty or the like, for strengt h· 
ening the nation is precisely the consensual reason for joining, and at the 
same time questionable in terms of effect. Whereas, for Germany, the 
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benefits are so much beyond any doubt that official praise of supra-
nationalism is evidently in order. For not only is it useful, but it makes it 
seem as if usefulness is not what it's all about -which can be quite useful 
too . It is in international as in private matters: it is bad manners to sport 
your riches and superiority; modesty is called for, particularly so in the 
North European morality context of Puritanism and self-control. (This 
question indirectly poses another, namely the standing of the other 
"supranational" though less influential Ee-members: for instance, Holland, 
Belgium and Italy. This is outside my scope here, but still I would like to 
indicate that "gain" in the Ee framework is not necessarily or originally 
economic: these countries (all losers in and/or severely damaged by the war 
and hence under the influence of the attendant erosion of nationalism in 
continental Europe) calculated their post-war strategies in terms of the 
political and/or moral dividends that would possibly accrue from closer 
European cooperation, for the Benelux countries specifically the immense 
advantage of securing an influence on (West) German affairs, thus keeping 
the "menacing" neighbour in check). 
3) The contrast between the Danish and the German cases/modulations is 
fairly clear-cut and obvious. The British case is more complicated. For, if 
my argument is tenable, here we are not confronted with a type of national 
identity that presents itself as such (DK), nor with the morally comprehen-
sible form of "supranationalism" representing national interests and 
ambitions (Germany), but with the more "quirky" case of a basically 
global, almost cosmopolitan internationalism often making crude nationalist 
gestures, wrapping itself in the national flag (and other similar symbols). 
This discrepancy between aims and discourse reverses the German case in 
an interesting way: appeals to a narrow-minded, inward-looking insular 
nationalism (the popular, idealised version of the national interest) are often 
cast in the role of symbolic vehicles of a much more wide-ranging 
international perspective. In other words, where, in the German case, the 
national interest seeks abode in a (European) supranational morality to the 
point of seemingly vanishing, in the British case the 'national interest' itself 
is often the discursive representative of supranational ambitions to the point 
of misrepresenting the true substance of the current national interest, or of, 
say interpreting real interests (e.g . maintaining sterling as an independent 
currency) as a quest for holding on to symbols of sovereignty. 
26 
4) The two countries with the most "stable" political cultures, with the most 
intact nationalisms and the greatest degree of "homogeneity" between state 
and people (DK and UK), have had great difficulties in accepting BC 
integrationism as a receptacle of identity and morality. At the same time 
they are also the ones to comply most faithfully with BC rules and 
regulations. This is sometimes seen to demonstrate - and perhaps spring 
from - the incompatibility of constitutionalist or legalistic as opposed to 
common-law and conventionalist political traditions - at least as far as UK 
is concerned. There may be some truth in this argument, but it seems to me 
that not too much emphasis should be placed on it. Without disputing that 
the legal systems of the EC (and e.g. France, Germany, Holland etc) and 
Great Britain are quite different, and that the British tradition knows of no 
superior authority to the one vested in Parliament (hence sovereignty is 
often seen to be indivisible), one of the supreme characteristics of British 
law and British politics is - really and admittedly - their adaptability. This 
they prove when they speedily and often with a minimum of delay 
implement EC regulations and comply with EC rulings. (Whereas e.g. 
Italy, France and Germany often do things in the opposite "order": in 
principle they adhere to supranational, integrationist principles, whereas in 
actual fact the honouring of obligations often seems a lot harder. Here the 
differences of political culture do come to the fore!) So, the conclusion 
would be more valid that often the "incompatibility" of political cultures 
and legal traditions is a handy argument - and can indeed be used on both 
sides as either "offensive" blame or "defensive" justification. Conversely, 
the possibility should of course not be ruled out that part of the background 
for Denmark's and Great Britain's compliance with EC regulations and 
legislation could be to create a counterpoise to the strident anti-EC rhetoric 
employed in the two member-states. 
* * * 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that although some of this might have left 
the impression that I have described an unchangeable ontological position, the 
historical dimension is significant: This whole complex is very much in a state 
of flux at present. Developments are weakening the "nationalist" discourse in 
Great Britain and Denmark, while strengthening them in Germany - "harmonisa-
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tion" with a difference if not with a vengeance! But it is a common featur e tl:t.at 
forms of "utility" and forms of "emotion" vis-a.-vis the nation-state and tile EC 
are entering into new configurations. This applies also to the forms in whic h 
"the Other" is perceived (contempt-recognition-respect etc) and to the relation 
between official and popular discourses and states of mentality. 
Apart from this, the future of the precise relationships between the natio D-
state/nationalism and the EC/supranationalism is not easy to predict. For 
"Europe cannot be what some nations have been: a people that creates 
its state; nor can it be what some of the oldest states are and many of 
the new ones aspire to be: a people created by the state. It has to wait 
until the separate states decide that their peoples are close enough to 
justify the setting up of a European state whose task will be the 
welding of the many into one. ( .. . ) Between the cooperation of 
existing nations and the breaking in of a new one there is no stable 
middle ground. A federation that succeeds becomes a nation; one that 
fails leads to secession; half-way attempts like supranational nmc-
tionalism must either snowball or roll back. " (Hoffmann 1968, 228-9). 
Indeed, as Hoffmann puts it at the end of his article, "there are more things i n 
the heaven and earth of possible international futures than i any philosophy of 
international relations" (230). All we are left with are hints and guesses, more 
or less qualified. 
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